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I. INTRODUCTION
It is a scenario with which most of us are far too familiar. You are sitting down
to dinner or watching TV and the phone rings. You hope that it is a friend or family
member calling, but most of the time, there is silence on the other end of the line as
the telemarketer on the other end waits for the predictive dialing device to notify him
or her that you have picked up.1 Such devices are responsible for ninety percent of

1

Predictive dialer systems use computers to dial many telephone lines at the same time and
then connect the calls to live operators who either deliver live messages or ask the recipient to
listen to prerecorded messages. Their purpose is to weed out busy tones, answering machines,
and numbers for which there is no answer. The goal is that a live call will be “waiting for
telemarketers the second they hang up from the previous call.” See Kelly Thornton, State

487
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all telemarketing calls.2 Before you get the chance to hang up, the obnoxious
telemarketer launches into a sales pitch. At the end of the annoying soliloquy, the
seller says that all they need to do is “verify” some information in order for you to
complete the purchase. It is at this point most of us say “no thank you” and hang up.
Some people say they ignore the call and go back to their daily routine.
However, by simply answering the phone the would-be consumer has already been
disturbed. Indeed, in such an advanced telecommunications society, it is very
difficult to ignore a ringing phone. As one commentator has put it, “[t]he telephone
should not be used as a vehicle for advertising. Unlike mail, or radio, or television
commercials, the telephone cannot be ignored at leisure. It demands sudden and
undivided attention.”3 The telephone has also been called a “uniquely invasive
technology” because it essentially “allows solicitors to come ‘into’ the home.”4
Moreover, consumer groups estimate that telemarketers, with the aid of computer
technology, make up to twenty-four million calls a day nationally.5 Nonetheless, the
telemarketing industry raked in a staggering $612 billion in 2000 and, at that rate, it
seems like the telemarketers are here to stay.6
There are federal and state laws that exist to help telephone subscribers combat
the problem, however, these laws are vastly inadequate. Much of the current
legislation exempts nonprofit organizations and charities even though commercial
and noncommercial calls inflict the same disturbance upon residential privacy.7
Even Congress has acknowledged that residential telephone subscribers that are
considered any unsolicited telephone call, regardless of the content or the initiator of
the message, to be a nuisance and an invasion of privacy.8 The good news, however,
is that states are beginning to pass legislation to further protect residential telephone
subscribers above and beyond the protections of federal law.9 Additionally,
consumers are beginning to understand their rights under federal law and are
exercising them through private actions against the telemarketers.10 However, the
Moves To Clamp Down on Telemarketing Hang-Ups; Beyond Being a Nuisance, Phantom
Calls Frighten Many, SAN DIEGO UNION & TRIBUNE, Aug. 13, 2001, at A1.
2

Arthur Winston, DM and Commercial Speech, DM NEWS, Feb. 22, 1993, at 18.

3

Joseph R. Cox, Telemarketing, The First Amendment, and Privacy: Expanding
Telemarketing Regulations Without Violating the Constitution, 17 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. &
POL’Y 403, 403-04 (1996).
4

Id. at 420.

5

Thornton, supra note 1, at A1.

6

CNN Today: Several States Considering Legislation That Would Restrict Telemarketing
(CNN television broadcast, Jan. 12, 2001) (transcript available in LEXIS, News, Transcript #
01011211V13).
7

Moser v. FCC, 811 F. Supp. 541, 545 (D. Or. 1992).

8

137 CONG. REC. H11307 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991).

9

5.6 Million People in 13 States say “Don’t Telemarket to Me,” COMMUNICATIONS DAILY,
September 5, 2001, available at 2001 WL 5053940 [hereinafter COMMUNICATIONS DAILY].
10

In Ohio alone, several individuals have exercised their right to sue telemarketers. Some
have even sued multiple times against multiple telemarketers and have collected significant
damages. See Irvine v. Akron Beacon Journal, No. 20450, 20524, 2002 WL 24324 (Ohio Ct.
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laws that regulate telemarketing do not apply to all organizations, and these
loopholes must be closed in order to protect consumers from the seemingly constant
barrage of telemarketing calls.
The first section of this Note examines the relevant federal laws that are already
in place to assist the frustrated public in avoiding these unwanted calls. The second
section discusses the constitutionality of such legislation and why it is considered to
improperly limit the freedom of commercial speech. The third section focuses upon
what the states have done to supplement the federal law and increase regulation as
well as the proposed changes in the federal law itself. The fourth section analyzes
the ineffectiveness of the federal and state regulations in place and specifically
argues against the allowance of exceptions in these laws, including those for
nonprofit organizations, charities, and companies with which the consumer has an
established business relationship.
II. THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 1991
A. Legislative History
In 1991, the public’s frustration at unwanted telephone solicitations became so
adamant that Congress was forced to respond. It passed the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act (hereinafter TCPA) which regulates the telemarketing industry so as
to protect consumers from unwanted telephone solicitations.11 According to one of
the Act’s framers, Edward J. Markey of Massachusetts, the TCPA was an attempt by
Congress to balance an individual’s right to privacy in the home with the advances
made in the telemarketing industry.12 Among other things, the law regulates
automated telephone equipment, fax machines, and live telemarketing.13
Specifically, the TCPA effectively prohibits telemarketers from using devices that
employ artificial or pre-recorded voices without the prior consent of the recipient.14
It also creates private rights of action as a way of empowering consumers to hold
telemarketers responsible for repeated calls over the recipient’s objections.15
According to the Act, if any person receives more than one unsolicited phone call in
violation of the Act, that person can pursue a private right of action against the entity
App. 9th Dist. Jan. 9, 2002) (finding newspaper liable for violations of Telephone Consumer
Protection Act (hereinafter TCPA)); Adamo v. AT&T, No. 79002, 2001 WL 1382757 (Ohio
Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2001) (affirming judgment for plaintiff against defendant AT&T for
violations of TCPA); Charvat v. Dispatch Consumer Serv., 769 N.E.2d 829 (Ohio 2002)
(holding that plaintiff effectively terminated his “established business relationship” with
newspaper by requesting to be placed on a “do-not call” list); Charvat v. Colorado Prime, No.
97APG09-1277, 1998 WL 634922 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 17, 1998) (reducing plaintiff’s
judgment because original telemarketing call does not count as a violation of TCPA); Charvat
v. ATW, Inc., 712 N.E.2d 805 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (holding that no private right of action
accrues under TCPA unless telemarketer calls more than once in a twelve-month period
without consumer’s consent).
11

Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C.A. § 227 (2002).

12

See 137 CONG. REC. E793-02 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1991) (statement of Rep. Markey).

13

See 47 U.S.C. § 227.

14

§ 227(b)(1)(A).

15

§ 227(b)(3), (c)(5).
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in violation.16 Such an action must be brought in an “appropriate” state court and
can be filed to enjoin such a violation, or to “recover actual monetary loss from such
a violation, or to receive up to $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is
greater[.]”17 In addition, the TCPA also allows a state to bring a civil action against
an entity if the state believes that the entity has engaged in a pattern or practice in
violation of the TCPA.18
More importantly, the TCPA directs the Federal Communications Commission
(hereinafter FCC) to use its regulatory power to formulate additional regulations to
meet the requirements of the Act.19 For instance, Congress invited the FCC to
consider a host of methods and procedures for regulating unsolicited sales calls,
including “the use of electronic databases, telephone network technologies, special
directory markings, [and] industry-based or company-specific ‘do not call’ systems.
…”.20 Congress also gave the FCC the option of developing a national “do not call”
database, which would entail the compilation of a national “list of telephone numbers
of residential subscribers who object to receiving telephone solicitations, and to
make that compiled list and parts thereof available for purchase.”21
Since the enactment of the TCPA, the FCC has responded to Congress’s
suggestions and has established its own set of regulations.22 However, the FCC
chose not to establish the national database, and left the creation and maintenance of
the “do-not-call” lists up to the telemarketers themselves.23 Also, the FCC
regulations state that a telemarketer must clearly state the name of the business or
individual initiating the call as well as the telephone number or address of the
business or individual.24 Furthermore, the regulations prohibit any telemarketer from
calling between the hours of 9 p.m. and 8 a.m. local time at the called party’s
location.25 Combined with the TCPA’s private right of action, any consumer can
potentially use a violation of these regulations to initiate a lawsuit against a

16

§ 227(b)(3).

17

§ 227(c)(5)(B).

18

§ 227(f).

19

§ 227(b)(2).

20

§ 227(c)(1)(A).

21

§ 227(c)(3).

22

See 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (2001).

23

47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e)(2)(i) (“Persons or entities making telephone solicitations must
have a written policy, available upon demand, for maintaining a do-not-call list.”); §
64.1200(e)(2)(iii) (“If a person or entity making a telephone solicitation…receives a request
from a residential telephone subscriber not to receive calls from that person or entity, the
person or entity must record the request and place the subscriber’s name and telephone
number on the do-not-call list at the time the request is made.”); § 64.1200(e)(2)(vi) (“A
person or entity making telephone solicitations must maintain a record of a caller’s request not
to receive future telephone solicitations. A do not call request must be honored for 10 years
from the time the request is made.”).
24

47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d).

25

47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e)(1).
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telemarketer.26 However, a consumer is not likely to succeed if the telemarketing
entity can prove that it has instituted measures to effectively prevent telephone
solicitations in violation of the TCPA and FCC regulations because the TCPA
expressly makes evidence of such efforts an affirmative defense.27
The TCPA also permits the FCC to exempt from these regulations those calls
made by noncommercial entities, including nonprofit organizations and charities, as
well as those entities with which the recipient already has an established business
relationship.28 According to one commentator, “Representative Markey claimed that
such an exception was ‘common sense,’ and that consumers do not mind certain
classes and categories of calls, presumably charitable, political, research, and other
noncommercial calls.”29 However, the TCPA grants the FCC authority to reconsider
these exceptions.30 To date, the FCC has allowed charities, nonprofit organizations,
and political groups to be exempt from the regulations. Thus, many state laws,
following the FCC’s lead, allow these exemptions to exist as well.31
B. Private Right of Action
1. Federal Jurisdiction vs. State Jurisdiction
Although the TCPA is federal law, it expressly gives states jurisdiction to hear
any private right of action consumers may bring against a telemarketing entity.32
Senator Ernest Hollings, the bill’s sponsor, defended such an express grant of
jurisdiction.33 Hollings believed that if consumers were to bring private actions
against violators of the TCPA, state jurisdiction would make it as easy as possible on
such consumers.34 Specifically, Senator Hollings envisioned that consumers would
26

See cases cited supra note 10. Many individuals who have filed suit have been
successful by simply alleging that the telemarketers did not send a written copy of their donot-call policy or that the telemarketers failed to provide the party called with a full name
and/or address of the telemarketing entity.
27

47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5)(C) (2002) (“It shall be an affirmative defense in any action
brought under this paragraph that the defendant has established and implemented, with due
care, reasonable practices and procedures to effectively prevent telephone solicitations in
violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection.”).
28
§ 227(a)(3). See infra text accompanying note 187 (for a definition of “established
business relationship”).
29

Howard E. Berkenblit, Can Those Telemarketing Machines Keep Calling Me?—The
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 After Moser v. FCC, 36 B.C. L. REV. 85, 99
(1994).
30
47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(1)(D) (2002) (“[T]he Commission shall initiate a rulemaking
proceeding…[and] the proceeding shall—consider whether there is a need for additional
Commission authority to further restrict telephone solicitations, including those calls
exempted under subsection (a)(3) of this section…”.).
31

See infra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.

32

47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), (c)(5).

33

See infra note 34 and accompanying text.

34

See Chair King Inc. v. Houston Cellular Corp., 131 F.3d 507, 513 (S.D. Tex. 1997)
(“Senator Hollings indicated the intent of the bill was for consumers to easily be able to
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bring pro se actions in state small claims courts because he did not want the
consumer burdened with having to litigate in common pleas courts and pay
substantial attorneys’ fees.35 Senator Hollings wanted to ensure that there was an
appropriate enforcement mechanism in place because, at the time the bill was
proposed, the FCC went on record that it was not persuaded that any kind of
legislation regulating telemarketing was necessary to address consumer complaints.36
Therefore, knowing the FCC’s lack of desire for enforcement, Senator Hollings
wanted to be sure that citizen enforcement would be effective and that states would
be able to facilitate such a citizen enforcement scheme.37
To be sure, the fact that a state court can have original jurisdiction in cases
arising under federal law is nothing new.38 By sharing jurisdiction with the national
government, the states ensure that the scales on the balance of power are not unfairly
tipped toward the federal government. Still, the U.S. Constitution provides that
federal law “shall be the supreme Law of the Land” and is controlling on every court
subject to it.39 Therefore, states not only have the authority to hear cases arising
under federal law, but may be obligated as well. Moreover, because the TCPA
appears to grant exclusive jurisdiction to the states to hear private actions, the
jurisdictional issues may become more complex.
2. Can the States Opt-Out?
Because the TCPA is a federal law that grants the states express jurisdiction to
hear cases arising from violations of the law, it creates controversy regarding any
discretion the states may have in interpreting the law or even choosing to hear the
cases at all. In his article, State Courts and the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
of 1991: Must States Opt-In? Can States Opt-Out?, Robert Biggerstaff addresses
the jurisdictional questions raised by the text of the TCPA as well as the states’
obligations to facilitate Senator Hollings’ vision of a citizen enforcement scheme.40
enforce the bill by recovering damages. He emphasized states should facilitate this by
providing fora in which consumers could appear without an attorney.”).
35

137 CONG. REC. S16204-01 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings),
(“Small claims court or a similar court would allow the consumer to appear before the court
without an attorney. …However, it would defeat the purposes of the bill if the attorneys’ costs
to consumers of bringing an action were greater than the potential damages.”).
36
See Biggerstaff, infra note 40, at n.66 (quoting FCC Chairman Alfred C. Sikes) (“It is
not clear, however, that sweeping Federal legislation is required….[T]his may be a situation
where continued regulatory scrutiny and monitoring, subject to Congressional review and
oversight, is preferable to passage of legislation.” (citations omitted)).
37

See 137 CONG. REC. S16204-01, supra note 35.

38

See The Federalist, No. 82, at 132 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward Gaylord Bourne ed.
1947) (“When…we consider the State governments and the national governments, as they
truly are,…as parts of ONE WHOLE, the inference seems to be conclusive, that the State courts
would have a concurrent jurisdiction in all cases arising under the laws of the Union, where it
was not expressly prohibited.”).
39

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.

40

Robert R. Biggerstaff, State Courts and the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of
1991: Must States Opt-In? Can States Opt-Out? 33 CONN. L. REV. 407 (2001).
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Biggerstaff argues that the TCPA is “no different from any other federal law in
regard to a state court’s ability and obligation to hear such cases,” and therefore, the
states do not have to formulate separate legislation that conforms to the TCPA in
order to hear such actions.41 However, in International Science & Technology
Institute v. Inacom Communications, Inc.,42 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit suggested that states are allowed to “opt-out” and close their courts to actions
under the TCPA.43 In response, Biggerstaff argues that the International Science
rationale is in error because a state does not have the authority to “arbitrarily close its
courts to TCPA actions while allowing similar state claims, any more than a state
could close its courts to FELA, RICO, or other federal causes of action.”44
If a state were allowed to “opt-out” of the TCPA’s citizen-enforced, regulatory
scheme, that state would be able to deny the enforcement of a federal law in its own
court system, thereby affecting the “very foundation of federal supremacy.”45 A
more plausible interpretation of the TCPA’s ambiguous language46 is that Congress
intended not only that states could hear cases brought under the TCPA without
additional state legislation, but also that states do not have the authority, absent an
explicit statement from Congress, to “opt-out” and refuse to hear such cases.47
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE TCPA
For the most part, the TCPA regulates commercial speech. Combined with the
language of the Act, as well as the FCC regulations, the TCPA dictates how and
when a telemarketer may make an unsolicited call to a residential telephone
subscriber.48 As a consequence, the TCPA has undergone substantial constitutional

41

Id. at 408.

42

Int’l Sci. & Technical Inst. v. Inacom Communications, Inc., 106 F.3d 1146, 1156 (4th
Cir. 1997). Plaintiff argued that a private right of action pursuant to the TCPA could only be
brought if there was state legislation that provided for a similar private action. Id. The
plaintiff’s reasoning was that if a state had not passed “opting-in” legislation, then any citizen
of that state would have to bring the case in Federal Court or else there would be an Equal
Protection Clause violation. Id. The court rejected this reasoning by holding simply that there
was no requirement for states to “opt-in” in order to hear claims brought under the TCPA. Id.
43
Biggerstaff, supra note 40, at 408 (Biggerstaff also defines the terms “opt-in” and “optout.” The former means an “action by a state legislature that singles out the TCPA; for
example a state law which provides: ‘Civil suits, under 47 U.S.C. § 227 are hereby authorized
to be heard in the courts of this State.’” The latter “refers to a state legislature enacting a law
that carves out a specific exception for the TCPA; for example, a state law that provides:
‘Civil suits, under 47 U.S.C. § 227 may not be heard in the courts of this State.’”).
44

Id. (citations omitted).

45

Id. at 426.

46

47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), (c)(5) (2002).

47

Biggerstaff, supra note 40, at 427-28. Biggerstaff concludes that “it is unquestioned that
states cannot obstruct the operation of federal laws….Congress has implemented citizen suits
as a primary enforcement mechanism in many statutes and has never provided that a state may
close its courts to such enforcement.” Id.
48

See generally 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 and 47 U.S.C. § 227.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2003

7

494

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:487

scrutiny since its enactment.49 Many scholars and judges have rendered their own
interpretations of the law, but the controversy still exists.50 One reason why this area
of federal law is still quite unsettled is because most actions brought under the TCPA
are brought in state small claims courts, as Senator Hollings envisioned.51 As one
commentator put it, “state small claims courts (over which Holmses, Hands, and
Cardozos rarely preside) are poor forums for producing uniform interpretations of
federal law,” and thus “essentially insures that few TCPA cases will result in
reasoned appellate decisions.”52
A. Regulation of Commercial Speech
When Congress enacted the TCPA, the goal was to be able to regulate the
telemarketing industry by balancing the residential telephone subscriber’s privacy
rights against the telemarketers’ free speech rights.53 Originally, commercial speech
was not afforded First Amendment protection,54 but gradually the Supreme Court
began to recognize some protection for this type of speech.55 The Court reasoned
that “the free flow of commercial information” was critical in order for consumers to
be able to make intelligent and well-informed purchasing decisions.56 However, the
Supreme Court has also recognized that commercial speech, while important, should
not be afforded the same kind of protection as other forms of speech.57 This
difference in treatment was formulated because commercial speech was regarded as
more durable than other forms of speech, and it was easier to verify.58
Thereafter, in 1980, the Supreme Court developed a four-part test in order to
examine acceptable restraints on commercial speech in Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.59 First, in order to come within the
49
See Deborah L. Hamilton, Note, The First Amendment Status of Commercial Speech:
Why the FCC Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 Are
Unconstitutional, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2352 (1996).
50

See id.

51

See supra note 34 and accompanying text.

52

Robert R. Biggerstaff and Hilary B. Miller, Application of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act to Intrastate Telemarketing Calls and Faxes, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 667, 669
(2000).
53
See Lisa Boardman Burnett and Consuelo Lauda Kertz, Telemarketing Tug-of-War:
Balancing Telephone Information Technology and the First Amendment with Consumer
Protection and Privacy, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1029, 1060 (1992).
54

See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).

55

See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).

56

Id. at 736-65.

57

Id. at 770-71, n.24.

58

Id. See also Boardman & Kertz, supra note 53, at 1042.

59

Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
(allowing electrical utility to bring suit in New York State court to challenge the
constitutionality of a regulation of the New York Public Service Commission that completely
banned promotional advertising by the utility).
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purview of the First Amendment, the speech must concern lawful activity and not be
misleading.60 Second, the government’s interest in promoting the restriction against
the commercial speech must be substantial.61 If the answer to both of these questions
is yes, a court must then determine “whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted, and [finally], whether it is not more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest.”62 According to the Central Hudson test, the TCPA
is constitutional as long as the government’s interest in the right to privacy of a
residential telephone subscriber is substantial, and the TCPA itself “directly
advances the governmental interest” and is “not more extensive than is necessary to
serve that interest.”63
The Supreme Court has also formulated a different constitutional test to examine
acceptable restraints on commercial speech. This method of analysis is the “time,
place, or manner” test, and was defined and illustrated by the Supreme Court in
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.64 In that case, commercial publishers brought
a civil rights action, requesting declaratory and injunctive relief against the
enforcement of a Cincinnati ordinance, which prohibited distribution of "commercial
handbills" on public property, and was used as a basis of ordering the removal of
newsracks that the publishers used to generate business.65 The publishers argued that
the ordinance distinguished the newsracks based on the content of the materials
inside because the ordinance did not ban newsracks that sold regular newspapers as
opposed to the free “magazines” offered by the plaintiffs.66
The Court rejected Cincinnati’s argument that the ordinance was only regulating
the time, place, and manner of the distribution of the plaintiffs’ magazines, which is
allowable provided that the government is adequately justified “without reference to
the content of the regulated speech.”67 The Court held that although the city has the
right to regulate the time, place, and manner of commercial speech, it could not do so
if the magazines were banned due to the “content of the publication resting inside
that newsrack.”68 The Court reasoned that the ban was “content based,” and
therefore unconstitutional.69 Ultimately, the “time, place, and manner” test is
essentially identical to the “commercial speech” test except for the non-content based
60

Id.

61

Id.

62

Id.

63

Id.

64

City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993).

65

Id. at 412-13.

66

Id. at 419 (The plaintiffs distributed free publications regarding adult educational,
recreational, and social activities as well as many advertisements, including, but not limited to,
real estate listings. Basically, the ordinance sought to prevent these free advertisements from
becoming sidewalk litter, as they often did.).
67

Id. at 428 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989), quoting
Clark v. Comty. For Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
68

Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 429.

69

Id.
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requirement. The remainder of the “time, place, and manner” test is intermediate
scrutiny, which means that government restrictions must be narrowly tailored to
serve a significant government interest.70 Basically, there must be a “reasonable fit”
between the means employed and the ends sought, and there must be “ample
alternative channels for communication of the information.”71
Moser v. FCC was one of the first cases that specifically challenged the
constitutionality of the TCPA.72 In that case, the National Association of
Telecomputer Operators (hereafter NATO) brought an action against the FCC.73
Because the TCPA banned the use of automated devices,74 NATO argued that the
law created a content-based restriction not narrowly tailored to further a substantial
government interest, and therefore violating the First Amendment and the “time,
place, and manner” test illustrated by Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.75 NATO
also claimed that the TCPA violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.76 In analyzing the Act, the Ninth Circuit classified the TCPA as a
“content-neutral, time, place and manner restriction” because nothing in the TCPA
required the FCC to differentiate between commercial and noncommercial speech
insofar as its prohibition on automated devices was concerned.77 Ultimately, the
court held that the TCPA could constitutionally ban all automated telemarketing calls
without having to ban all other telemarketing calls.78 This “underinclusiveness”
approach did not render the TCPA unconstitutional because underinclusiveness only
constitutes a violation when “a regulation represents an attempt to give one side of a
debatable public question an advantage in expressing its views to the people.”79
B. Is a Complete Ban Unconstitutional?
The Moser court did not specifically say that a complete ban on all telemarketing
calls would be unconstitutional because the issue did not have to be addressed for
adjudication.80 However, the court seemingly left the door open for such a ban, just
as the TCPA had done by allowing the FCC to consider whether further restrictions
on telemarketing would be necessary.81 To date, there is little authority on the
constitutionality of a complete telemarketing ban, but the First Amendment arguably

70

Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).

71

Cox, supra note 3, at 408 (citations omitted).

72

Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1995).

73

Id. at 973.

74

47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A).

75

Moser, 46 F.3d at 973.

76

Id.

77

Id.

78

Id. at 975.

79

Id. at 974 (citing First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 785-86 (1978)).

80

See Moser, 46 F.3d 970.

81

47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(1)(D).
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ensures that such a ban would likely be held unconstitutional.82 Both commercial
speech and speech made by tax-exempt, nonprofit organizations involve a number of
First Amendment implications;83 a complete ban would have to withstand the First
Amendment’s free speech guarantees. Furthermore, a complete ban, although a
seemingly good solution to the most frustrated of residential telephone subscribers, is
not supported in most laws regulating telemarketing.84 Indeed, almost every piece of
state and federal legislation, including the TCPA, allows for the exemption of certain
types of calls, most notably nonprofit organizations, charities, and political groups.85
However, Joseph Cox has argued that under the present law, including the
Central Hudson and Discovery Network tests, a complete ban on all telemarketing
calls “without prior knowledge of consent” would be constitutional.86 Under this
reasoning, telemarketers could only call if the recipient had previously consented to
being called. This, in turn, would be spinning the “presumption back on its feet,”
meaning “it presumes people do not want to be solicited absent a request … instead
of presuming they want to be called.”87 In acknowledging the widespread exemption
of charities and nonprofits, Cox retreats and argues that any law which seeks to
regulate telemarketing should leave these exemptions in place, even if the
government gathered information which revealed that most people do not want to be
bothered by charitable solicitations either.88
Why are charities and nonprofits excluded in the first place? Historically,
charitable speech has been afforded more protection than commercial speech.89
According to one court, “charitable solicitation involves a variety of speech interests
protected by the First Amendment; therefore, it is not purely ‘commercial speech,’
and it is subject to traditional ‘strict scrutiny’ under the First Amendment.”90 Unlike
the commercial speech tests of Central Hudson and Discovery Network, charitable
and nonprofit speech is judged by a higher constitutional standard than pure
commercial speech.91 Furthermore, under this “strict scrutiny” test, “[a] restriction
subject to strict scrutiny must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state
interest.”92

82

See Hamilton, supra note 49.

83

Id.

84

See infra note 109 and accompanying text.

85

Id.

86

Cox, supra note 3, at 421.

87

Id. at 422.

88

Id. at 423.

89

Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748.

90

Am. Ass’n of State Troopers, Inc. v. Preate, 825 F. Supp. 1228, 1232 (M.D. Pa. 1993)
(citing Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 787-88 (1988)).
91

Id.

92

State Troopers, Inc., 825 F. Supp. at 1232 (citing Int’l Soc. For Krishna Consciousness,
Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992)).
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However, it would seem as though a complete ban on telemarketing calls both
commercial and noncommercial alike would be achieving a “compelling state
interest” if the vast majority of citizens of a particular jurisdiction wanted such a ban.
Conceivably, the courts could balance the privacy interests of residential telephone
subscribers with the speech interests of telemarketers and decide that the privacy
interests were greater. Indeed, “[a]ll of the courts have consistently held that the
privacy right of the home is a significant interest.”93
Furthermore, whether the deciding court uses the “time, place, and manner” test,
the Central Hudson four-part test, or strict scrutiny, a complete telemarketing ban
could still be found constitutional. Assuming strict scrutiny is used, which is the
most difficult test to satisfy of the three, the government would have to show that the
regulation was “narrowly tailored” and that the state interest was “compelling.”94
Arguably, a complete ban might not be seen as narrowly tailored if there were a less
restrictive means of achieving the same objective. However, the government could
then show that the only reasonable means of ensuring a residential telephone
subscriber’s privacy is indeed a complete ban. Such an argument could also be
bolstered by a finding of overwhelming support in the particular state or jurisdiction
for a complete ban. In addition, the ban itself would not have to be total. As Cox
notes, a constitutional ban would only have to apply to those consumers who did not
wish to be called.95 Therefore, it appears that a complete ban on all telemarketing
calls, both commercial as well as nonprofit, could survive constitutional scrutiny. As
Cox argues, “there are likely no constitutional limitations to banning telemarketing
calls to all people except those who have expressed a desire to receive them.
Congress or the states should feel secure in their authority to take additional steps to
protect their citizens from a disliked, if not loathed, practice.”96
IV. FURTHER REGULATION: THE DO-NOT-CALL APPROACH
When the TCPA was enacted, Congress authorized the FCC to establish its own
regulations regarding telephone solicitations.97 In enacting these regulations,98 the
FCC decided not to establish a national do-not-call database.99 Instead, the FCC
chose to leave the do-not-call list implementation to the telemarketing entities.100 In
response, the states have begun to pass legislation creating their own do-not-call

93

Cox, supra note 3, at 420.

94

State Troopers, Inc., 825 F. Supp. at 1232.

95

Cox, supra note 3, at 421-22 (“Therefore, the government should…fashion restrictions
so they do not amount to a blanket ban but…only a ban on calls made without prior
knowledge of consent. Essentially, this takes regulations one step further than ‘do-not-call’
lists: the homeowner does not have to endure even a single call from each telemarketer.”).
96

Id. at 423.

97

47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2) (2002) (“The Commission shall prescribe regulations to
implement the requirements of this subsection.”).
98

See 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (2002).

99

See supra note 23 and accompanying text.

100

Id.
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databases101, and the idea of a national do-not-call database has again been
proposed.102 However, there are many real and potential problems involved in
establishing such databases, and those that have already been established continue to
face criticism for lack of effectiveness as well as poor cost efficiency.103
A. State Regulation
As of September 2001, fourteen different states had enacted “no call” laws,
which allow residential telephone subscribers to register their names and/or numbers
with telemarketers as those not to be called.104 The largest lists belong to New York
and Missouri, which have amassed 1.8 million and 1.5 million names respectively.105
Almost all of these laws prescribe heavy penalties ranging from $2,000 per violation
to $25,000, and the telemarketers must pay an annual fee in order to consult the state
lists, which are usually published quarterly.106 According to Gryphon Networks, a
company that specializes in providing no-call list administrative services, twenty-six
additional states are considering some kind of no-call legislation, further proving that
consumers have had enough of pesky telemarketers and are influencing their own
state legislatures to address the problem.107 In effect, the flood of recent state
legislation is “a signal of how unpopular telemarketing has become among
Americans.”108
While many consumers are delighted at the flood of state action against
telemarketers, the resulting legislation is not immune from criticism. According to
one commentator, “a myriad of exemptions and lax enforcement in many states
threaten their ultimate effectiveness.”109 Moreover, “the statutes are layered with
exemptions for charities, political groups, and companies that already have a
101

See COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, supra note 9.

102

Robert Hager, Hotline to Stop Telemarketers, (Jan. 22, 2002), available at
http://www.msnbc.com/news/692357.asp?pne=ms.
103

See Michael E. Shannon, Combating Unsolicited Sales Calls: The “Do-Not-Call”
Approach to Solving the Telemarketing Problem, 27 J. LEGIS 381 (2001).
104

See COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, supra note 9.

105

Id. (The other states include Conn., 750,000 names; Tenn., 636,000; Ga., 224,500; Fla.,
143,400; Ky., 123,000; Ind., 115,000; Or., 43,000; Idaho, 38,700; Ark., 16,000; Alaska, 5,300;
Wis., N/A. Colorado also has 230,000 maintained by Bighorn Center, a nonprofit association,
which will be added once the law is enacted in 2002. The total number of names on statewide
do-not-call lists is upwards of 5.6 million.).
106

Id.

107

Id.

108

Craig Savoye, States Spare Residents from Telemarketers, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Dec. 22, 2000, at 2, available at 2000 WL 4433175.
109

Shannon, supra note 103, at 411 (citing Jerry Markon, Take Me Off Your List! (Pretty
Please?) STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Dec. 27, 2000, at 1D, also available at 2000
WL 7003353.) Shannon also notes, “No-call laws…offer consumers the ability to opt out of
most unwanted sales calls, provided that they are not burdened by exemptions for too many
types of solicitors. While some statutes are fairly effective, and some are merely adequate,
still others have enough loopholes to render them practically unenforceable.” Id.
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relationship with the consumer.”110 For example, there are twenty-two different
exemptions under Kentucky’s no-call law, making it “one of the weakest in the
nation.”111 Furthermore, some states have refused to fine telemarketers even though
their laws have been in place for several years.112
In addition to the criticism that these laws do not go far enough in their
regulations, any state legislation that regulates the telemarketing industry must also
pass constitutional muster. One author has identified two different constitutional
issues associated with state telemarketing legislation including federal preemption of
state law and “dormant” Commerce Clause analysis.113 In his article, Michael
Shannon notes the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit in Van Bergen v. Minnesota, which states that “federal law can preempt state
law without an express statement by Congress when the federal statute implies an
intention to preempt state law or when state law directly conflicts with federal
law.”114 However, Shannon also notes the TCPA language that states, “nothing in
this section or in the regulations prescribed under this section shall preempt any State
law that imposes more restrictive intrastate requirements or regulations. …”115 He
then concludes that it is unclear whether state telemarketing legislation applies to
interstate calls as well, and that “although there is no express statement in the TCPA
that indicates Congress wanted to preempt state laws that affect interstate
telemarketing, a court might conclude that the statute implied that intent.”116
In his commerce clause analysis, Shannon recognizes that “the Supreme Court
has ruled that the Commerce Clause operates on a negative basis to prevent state
laws that unduly burden interstate commerce.”117 Under this traditional “dormant”
Commerce Clause analysis, state laws are examined to determine whether they
substantially interfere with interstate commerce.118 The resulting implication
regarding the TCPA is that if a state law were to regulate telemarketing, how would
such a law apply to out-of-state telemarketers? In other words, would such a law be
regulating the interstate “commerce” of telecommunications, and therefore be in
violation of the Commerce Clause itself?

110

Markon, supra note 109, at 1D.

111

Shannon, supra note 103, at 412.

112

Id. (“No Alaska telemarketer has been fined since passage of no-call legislation in
1996. Arkansas has yet to fine anyone either—probably because the state allows telephone
solicitors eight to ten free violations. Even states that do fine telemarketers do not…do so to
the full extent the laws allow.” (citations omitted)).
113

Id. at 413.

114

Id. at 414 (citing Van Bergen v. Minnesota, 59 F.3d 1541, 1548 (8th Cir. 1995)).

115

Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 227(e)(1)).

116

Shannon, supra note 103, at 414.

117

Id. at 415 (citing General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 287 (1997) (citing
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 437 (1980))).
118

General Motors Corp., 519 U.S. at 287.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol50/iss3/6

14

2002-03]

HOW CAN THEY KEEP CALLING ME?

501

One particular case that may shed some light on the dormant Commerce Clause
issue is American Library Ass’n v. Pataki.119 In that case, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York examined a New York law regarding
the transmission of harmful material over the Internet, specifically to children.120
The court held the law to be in violation of the Commerce Clause because the Act,
“by its terms…applies to any communication, intrastate or interstate, that fits within
the prohibition and over which New York has the capacity to exercise criminal
jurisdiction.”121 Therefore, the law was “per se violative of the Commerce
Clause.”122
If the Pataki Court’s rationale is applied to any state law that attempts to regulate
interstate telemarketing activity, then the state laws may be invalidated. To date,
such a challenge has yet to occur,123 but appears imminent considering what is at
stake for the telemarketing industry.124
Regardless, most state laws seeking to regulate telemarketing are too weak to be
effective.125 More importantly, the inconsistency in state regulations would wreak
havoc on the telemarketers who would be constantly striving to comply with the
regulations and apply them state-by-state. Furthermore, the state regulations might
be a usurpation of federal authority. The only logical solution appears to be a federal
remedy, which by its very nature, would be a uniform application of the law. The
question, however, is what that federal remedy should entail.
B. The Federal Proposal-A National List
One solution offered by numerous commentators, scholars, and legislators is the
creation of a national do-not-call list, whereby one large registry would be formed
for people who did not wish to receive telemarketing calls.126 The creation of such a
list is specifically authorized by the TCPA,127 and until recently,128 the FCC and the

119

American Library Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).

120

Id. at 163.

121

Id. at 169-70.

122

Id. at 183-84. But see Shannon, supra note 103, at n.288 (citing James E. Gaylord,
Note, State Regulatory Jurisdiction and the Internet: Letting the Dormant Commerce Clause
Lie, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1095, 1127 (1999) (arguing that eventually the courts may let the states
slide and allow them to regulate out-of-state activity specifically directed to any in-state
resident).
123

Shannon, supra note 103, at 417 (“The outcome…would likely decide the fate of nocall laws in general: if the states were not permitted to address the problem of out-of-state
telemarketers calling state residents, only Congress or the FCC could enact effective do-notcall legislation—something for which neither body has shown much inclination to date.”).
124

Telemarketing companies report that every dollar spent on calls brings back eight times
as much in sales, totaling more than $600 billion annually. See Hager, supra note 102.
125

See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.

126

See Hager, supra note 102.

127

47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(3).

128

See Hager, supra note 102.
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Federal Trade Commission (hereinafter FTC) have disregarded the option.129
However, in 2002, the FTC revisited the idea of a national do-not-call registry and
announced a formal proposal.130 Under the plan, the FTC would supplement the
current company-specific do-not-call provision with an additional provision that will
enable a consumer to stop calls from all companies within the FTC’s jurisdiction by
registering with a central do-not-call list maintained by the FTC.131 However, there
is one large catch in the proposal: the plan itself is limited by the FTC’s own
jurisdiction, which means that any national do-not-call database would not apply to
banks, telephone companies, airlines, insurance companies, credit unions, charities,
political campaigns, and political fundraisers.132 Not surprisingly, such organizations
are among those who make the lion’s share of all telemarketing calls.133
However, certain telemarketers, including those selling home repairs, vacations,
and financial investments would most likely not be exempt, and under the new rules,
telemarketers who make calls in violation of the national list would face fines of up
to $11,000 per violation.134 Furthermore, the FTC may also be able to limit calls
made on behalf of charitable organizations as mandated by the Patriot Act, which
was passed in response to the events of September 11, 2001.135
Not surprisingly, such a national registry is likely to meet strong opposition from
the telemarketing industry. Robert Wientzen, the president and chief executive of
129

The Federal Trade Commission (hereinafter FTC) also has jurisdiction regarding the
regulation of telemarketing practices. In 1994, Congress passed the Telemarketing and
Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6101-08 (West 1998).
Pursuant to the authority granted it by the Act, the FTC passed the Telemarketing Sales Rule
(hereinafter TSR) in 1995, codified in the Code of Federal Regulations, 16 C.F.R. § 310
(2002). The TSR closely mirrors the FCC’s regulations found in 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200,
especially regarding the maintenance of company-specific do-not-call lists, time restrictions,
and the disclosure of information. See 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)-(c). The national do-not-call
proposal is one element of the FTC’s proposal to modify the TSR. See FTC File No. R411001
(Jan. 22, 2002), FTC Proposes National “Do-Not-Call” Registry, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/01/donotcall.htm.
130

See Hager, supra note 102.

131

See FTC File No. R411001 (Jan. 22, 2002), at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/01/
donotcall.htm. The proposal also calls for permitting a consumer who registers with the
central “list” to receive telemarketing sales calls from an individual company or charitable
organization to which the consumer has provided his or her express verifiable authorization to
make telemarketing calls to the consumer (emphasis added). In addition, the proposal also
prohibits the practice of blocking telemarketer name and/or number information for caller
identification purposes as well as clarifying that the use of predictive dialers resulting in “dead
air” violates the Rule. Id.
132

Kevin G. DeMarrais, Curbs on Marketing Calls Sought by FTC, THE RECORD, Jan. 23,
2002, at A01.
133

Id.

134

Id.

135

Id. The Patriot Act does not change the exemption of charitable organizations from
FTC jurisdiction, but it does “enable the FTC to act against for-profit companies that engage
in fraudulent, deceptive, or abusive practices when they solicit contributions on behalf of
charities or purported charities.” Id.
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The Direct Marketing Association,136 has asserted that “[t]he telemarketing sector is
an essential part of … [the] communications and marketing industry.…”137 The
telemarketing industry also employs more than six million people, and the industry is
ready to vigorously defend itself and attack any proposal which “overstep[s] its
boundaries by spending taxpayer dollars to limit communication that is protected by
the First Amendment to American consumers who benefit from and shop via
telephone solicitations….”138 The national list may also drive some telemarketers
out of the country in order to avoid the new regulations.139
A national do-not-call list, if put into effect, also faces severe logistical problems.
In 1992, the FCC issued a report along with its regulations prescribed by the
TCPA.140 The report acknowledged that a national list could cost between $20
million and $80 million, to implement, and maintenance of the list could cost federal
taxpayers up to another $20 million annually.141 But cost is only the beginning of the
problem. The national list would put small businesses at a disadvantage, and
ultimately, the additional costs to large and small businesses alike would be passed
on to consumers.142 There are also overriding privacy concerns. For instance, if a
consumer is to join the national list, what information must he or she give, and how
will that information be protected? What if a consumer, whose number is unlisted
but continues to receive telemarketing calls, wants his or her name on the list? How
can that individual be sure the information he/she gives remains confidential?143 If
and when a national list is formed, consumers will likely want suitable answers to
such questions.
Another problem faced by a national do-not-call database is obsolescence.144 The
FCC’s report noted that one-fifth of all telephone numbers change each year, and
therefore the national database “would be continuously obsolete and would require
constant updates in order to remain accurate.”145 Despite these numerous problems,

136

The Direct Marketing Association (hereinafter DMA) is a New York-based trade
organization that represents some 5,000 companies nationwide. For twenty-five years, the
association has maintained its “Telephone Preference Service,” which is essentially a national,
privately funded do-not-call list whereby member organizations are prohibited from calling
residential telephone subscribers as a condition of membership. See DeMarrais, supra note
132, at A01.
137

Id.

138

Id. (quoting DMA president Robert Wientzen).

139

David Ho, Rules Aim to Curb Telemarketers, AP ONLINE, Jan. 22, 2002, available at
2002 WL 10034093.
140

In re Rules & Regulations Implementing the TCPA of 1991, 7 F.C.C.R. 8752, 8758-61
(1992).
141

Id. at 8758 (citing comments of AT&T).

142

Shannon, supra note 103, at 396.

143

For more on the potential privacy implications regarding a national do-not-call
database, see id.
144

Id. at 401.

145

In re Rules & Regulations, 7 F.C.C.R. at 8759.
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some commentators favor the national do-not-call list,146 and the popularity of the
idea has yet to fade, as is evidenced by the FTC’s latest proposal. However,
problems persist because a national list would not include many of the most
notorious telemarketers, including phone companies and charities.147 The FTC
simply does not have jurisdiction to limit such telemarketers,148 and ultimately a
national list would not significantly stop those annoying calls which always seem to
come at the most inappropriate times. In the end, a national list would only serve to
frustrate consumers who continue to get these unwanted calls even though their
number is on the national database.
V. THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF STATE AND FEDERAL LAWS
The ineffectiveness of the TCPA as implemented by FCC regulations is likely
one of the most significant reasons why states have initiated their own telemarketing
regulations.149 States have recognized the weakness of the federal laws and
regulations and have responded by getting tougher on telemarketing. However, the
state laws themselves are not perfect.150 Ironically, many of the state laws also
possess the same particular weaknesses of the federal laws, the most significant
being the exemptions of nonprofits and other organizations.151 The elimination of
these weaknesses should be the goal of any legislation which regulates telemarketing
in order to relieve consumers of unwanted solicitation calls.
A. Private Organizations-A Voice for Frustrated Consumers
In response to the apparent weaknesses in the present state and federal laws,
some consumers have created organizations dedicated solely to the elimination of
what they call the “tele-nuisance industry.”152 One such organization is called
Private Citizen, and promotes itself as “America’s first, largest, and most effective
organization of its type to cut your junk calls and junk mail.”153 Robert Bulmash, a
frustrated consumer whom telemarketers seemingly pushed too far, founded the
organization in 1988, which sends its members do-not-call requests to over 1,500

146

Shannon, supra note 103, at 402 (“Given the choice between a do-not-call system with
this level of effectiveness and a company specific system that requires consumers to notify
every company not to call them individually, it would seem that Americans prefer the former
approach.”).
147

See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.

148

Id.

149

See Thornton, supra note 1, at A1 (“Federal law makes companies keep ‘do-not-call’
lists….But most consumer activists say the law has loopholes. As a result, some states have
laws to create ‘do-not-call’ lists and to ban or limit…[other telemarketing practices].”).
150

See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.

151

Id.

152

Markon, supra note 109, at 1D (quoting Robert Bulmash, president of Private Citizen
Inc., a consumer advocacy group dedicated to battling the telemarketing industry).
153

Private Citizen, Inc., Home Page at http://www.privatecitizen.com (last visited Aug. 31,

2002).
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telemarketing firms nationally.154 For twenty dollars a year, Private Citizen members
authorize the organization to send telemarketers a “contract,” whereby any
telemarketer who calls the member without prior authorization agrees to pay that
particular member $100.155 Although some lawyers argue that such a “contract” may
not withstand strict legal scrutiny, many telemarketers who receive do-not-call
requests honor these requests anyway.156
Another consumer organization advocating the eradication of nuisance calls is
Junkbusters, which maintains a website dedicated to informing consumers of how to
get telemarketers to stop calling.157 As part of its informational service, Junkbusters
publishes a “script” which consumers should use when telemarketers call.158 By
making this script available, consumers will be able to properly inform telemarketers
of their desire not to be called again as well as gather information to use as evidence
in a potential lawsuit.159 The Junkbusters website also provides consumers with links
to other telemarketing websites as well as an extensive guide on how telemarketing
works.160
Junkbusters also assists consumers in contacting the Direct Marketing
Association (hereinafter DMA).161 The DMA, a New York-based trade organization
serving the direct marketing field, is perhaps the closest thing to self-regulation by
the telemarketing industry.162 Members of the DMA include 4,800 different
businesses who promise not to telemarket DMA members. Some have praised the
DMA by acknowledging that it is in the telemarketing industry’s “best interest to
avoid calling those consumers who are bothered by telemarketing calls.”163 In other
words, telemarketing will be more efficient in general if telemarketers refrain from
calling those consumers who do not wish to be called and will therefore probably not
buy anyway.
Nevertheless, organizations like Private Citizen, Junkbusters, and DMA are
limited in their effectiveness. Many consumers are unaware of their services, which
154

See id.

155

Michael Miller, When the “Junker” Calls, This Man Is Ready for Revenge, WALL ST.
J., June 24, 1991, at A1.
156

Id.

157

Junkbusters, Inc., Home Page at http://www.junkbusters.com (last visited Aug. 31,
2002) [hereinafter Junkbusters].
158

Id.

159

Id. Junkbusters does not guarantee a consumer success if he or she takes legal action
against the telemarketer. However, the organization does inform the consumer about what the
law is, what constitutes a violation of the law, and whether such a violation is one for which
the TCPA allows a private right of action. Id.
160

Id.

161

See Junkbusters, supra note 157.

162

Shannon, supra note 103, at 386. The DMA created the Telephone Preference Service,
whereby consumers can call and request to have their numbers put on its do-not-call list. This
list is then sent to and used by approximately 4800 member businesses nationwide. Id.
163

Id.
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are limited. Consumers continue to receive unwanted telemarketing calls, and more
importantly, private consumer groups and services cannot stop the barrage of
unwanted calls from telemarketers who are exempt from the federal regulations,
including nonprofits, charities, and political organizations.164
B. Numerous Exceptions
In defining the term “telephone solicitation,” the TCPA specifically excludes
calls made by tax-exempt nonprofit organizations as well as those organizations with
which the caller has an established business relationship.165 Over the eleven-year
history of the TCPA, this exclusionary language has been interpreted to apply to
most nonprofit organizations, charities, and political organizations/campaigns.166
However, many of these organizations are often the biggest telemarketing
offenders.167
The irony is that the TCPA does not necessarily mandate exemptions for such
tax-exempt, nonprofit organizations.168 In fact, the solution already exists within the
TCPA because it authorizes the FCC to reconsider such exemptions regarding
nonprofits and related organizations.169 Therefore, if the Act is applied to its full
potential, charities, tax-exempt nonprofit organizations, and even political groups
and organizations would also be subject to the FCC regulations under the TCPA.
In addition, the TCPA also exempts organizations with which the consumer has
an established business relationship.170 At first glance, this exception may seem
logical, but such an exception is simply another loophole that telemarketers may
attempt to use to bypass punishment under the TCPA.171 For instance, if a consumer
requests placement on a telephone solicitor’s do-not-call list for one service but
continues to buy a separate service from the soliciting entity, is he or she protected
by the TCPA? As will be discussed later, the Charvat v. Dispatch Consumer
Services172 case may hold an answer favorable to consumers. Nevertheless, the
“established business relationship” exception must be reevaluated and/or eliminated
on a national scale in order to protect consumers from the potential abuse such an
exception may allow.

164

Id. at 388.

165

47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(3).

166

Keala Murdock, Telemarketers Get Excommunicated, COLORADO SPRINGS BUSINESS
JOURNAL, May 18, 2001, at 4, available at 2001 WL 11294014.
167

DeMarrais, supra note 132, at A01.

168

47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(1)(D).

169

Id.
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47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(3).
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See Charvat v. Dispatch Consumer Serv., 769 N.E.2d 829 (Ohio 2002).
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Id.
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1. Charities, Politics, and Non Profits — Who Is Really Getting the Money?
As the TCPA dictates, tax-exempt nonprofit organizations are exempt from the
regulations imposed by it as well as FCC regulations.173 Representative Markey, one
of the bill’s sponsors, noted that these exemptions were “common sense,” and that
consumers “do not mind” certain classes and categories of calls, presumably
charitable, political, research, and other noncommercial calls.174 Also, charities and
nonprofit organizations enjoy more constitutional protection because their speech is
noncommercial.175 However, even under the “strict scrutiny” test, a state or federal
law involving the regulation of these ordinarily-exempted entities could survive
constitutional scrutiny as long as it was “narrowly tailored” and there was a
“compelling government interest.”176
Furthermore, whether charitable or commercial, many consumers loathe
telemarketing calls altogether; and consumer advocates argue that state and federal
laws riddled with exemptions for charities and nonprofits do not help in cutting back
unwanted calls.177 Even the telemarketing industry has acknowledged that the
numerous exemptions in federal and state laws produce a watered-down effect.178
According to Matt Mattingly, director of government affairs for the American
Teleservices Association, which represents the telemarketing industry, the laws are
often bogged down with exceptions, and that is one reason why there is so much
dissatisfaction with the current federal rules.179
Another justification for stripping charities and nonprofits of their exempted
status under the TCPA and FCC regulations is that on average, only twenty-four
percent of all donations made to charities will actually be received by the charities.180
The rest usually goes to the telemarketing firm that was hired to make the solicitation
calls.181 Sometimes, the charities only receive as little as five or ten percent of the
gross donated amount.182 Such a practice is often a necessary evil for small or
unpopular charities that employ solicitors to build a donor base and gain name
173

47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(3).

174

See Berkenblit, supra note 29, at 99.

175

Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).

176

Am. Ass’n of State Troopers, Inc. v. Preate, 825 F. Supp. 1228, 1232 (M.D. Pa. 1993).

177

Jon Van, Phone Solicitor Restrictions Face Hard Battle Before FTC; Observers Say
Eventual Result May Be Watered-Down Rules, THE CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Jan. 27, 2002, at
4E.
178

Need CITE

179

Id. (Mattingly stated, “First, they exempt politicians who are calling for your
vote…Then there are charities, and then businesses with which you have an existing
relationship. Pretty soon, there are enough exemptions that it’s only certain people who can’t
call you, and the excluded group gets smaller and smaller.”).
180
Antitelemarketer.com,
visited Aug. 31, 2002).

at

http://www.antitelemarketer.com/index2k18x6.htm

(last

181

Id.

182

Developments in the Law — Nonprofit Corporations, IV. Charitable Solicitation, 105
HARV. L. REV. 1634, 1634.
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recognition.183 However, this type of contingent-fee solicitation may actually be
doing more harm than good. According to one source, “excessive contingent-fee
solicitation increases fundraising costs for all charities, reduces actual charitable
output, and tends over time to promote the interests of large ‘establishment’ charities
over those of newer organizations. Most seriously, contingent-fee fundraising
dissipates the substantial goodwill that charities have traditionally enjoyed with the
donating public.”184
When viewed in light of the events of September 11, 2001, the effects of
contingent-fee telemarketing seems even more alarming. In response to the terrorist
attacks, Americans gave over $1.4 billion to the survivors.185 However, three months
after the attacks, New York’s Attorney General was already investigating two
charities, the New York Firefighters Foundation and the New York Police
Scholarship Fund.186 Both charities were operating out of Florida, and investigators
said that both charities had “nothing to do with the city’s fire and police
departments.”187 Consequently, it seems that charities, nonprofits, and related
organizations as well as the telemarketing firms they employ are just as fallible and
vulnerable to fraud as any other entity that uses telemarketing.188 For that reason, all
tax-exempt nonprofit organizations like charities and political groups should be
subject to the same standards as other telemarketers under the TCPA and FCC
regulations.
2. The Established Business Relationship Loophole
One of the additional exemptions afforded by the TCPA and FCC regulations is
where the party being called has an “established business relationship”189 with the
organization or business doing the telemarketing.190 At first glance, such an
exemption may seem logical. After all, many businesses may want to contact their

183

Id.

184

Id. See also NBC News: Nightly News, Profile: Some Charities Getting Very Few of
the Dollars We Pledge [hereinafter NBC News] (NBC television broadcast, Dec. 20, 2001)
(transcript available at 2001 WL 24025448).
185

See NBC News supra note 184.

186

Id.

187

Id. (“Yet last year, according to state records, [both] charities used telemarketers to
raise over $1 million, but got less than ten percent of the donations.” The head of one of the
charities said he was not taking advantage of anyone, but he refused to tell NBC News what he
did with his ten percent.).
188

It is estimated that Americans lose $40 billion a year to fraudulent telemarketers and the
FBI estimates that there are 14,000 illegal sales operations bilking consumers in the United
States every day. Antitelemarketer.com, supra note 180.
189
47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 defines “established business relationship” as “a prior or existing
relationship formed by a voluntary two-way communication between a person or entity and a
residential subscriber…on the basis of an inquiry, application, purchase or
transaction…regarding products or services offered by such person or entity, which
relationship has not been previously terminated by either party.” Id.
190

§ 227(a)(3) and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(3).
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existing customers and the customers themselves may want to hear from the
business, especially if the business, for example, is having a special sale or offer only
for existing customers.191 However, the exemption can also impose a severe burden
to a consumer who unwittingly purchases a product or service from a business. For
example, if the business uses the consumer’s purchase as a basis to solicit the
consumer to buy other products or services that the business produces or provides,
the consumer has no recourse because he or she has established a “business
relationship” with the company or business, and the soliciting entity may make all
the sales calls it wants.
However, a recent decision by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Charvat v. Dispatch
Consumer Services can be seen as nothing less than an overwhelming victory for
consumers on this particular issue. 192 In Charvat, the plaintiff subscribed to the
Sunday edition of the Columbus Dispatch newspaper.193 Although the plaintiff did
not wish to receive the newspaper every day, the newspaper continued to place
solicitation calls, encouraging Charvat to subscribe on a daily basis.194 Charvat
therefore asked the newspaper to put his number on its do-not-call list, but the
newspaper did not heed his request and continued to place sales calls to him.195
Thereafter, Charvat instituted an action to recover damages pursuant to the
newspaper’s alleged violations of the TCPA.196 In affirming the dismissal of
Charvat’s claim, the Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth District, Franklin County, held
that the plain language of the TCPA and the FCC’s definition of “established
business relationship” exempted the newspaper from federal regulations.197
Therefore, Charvat would have no recourse and would have to continue accepting
the solicitation calls from the Columbus Dispatch.198
In reversing the Court of Appeals’ decision, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that
“an existing customer can effectively terminate an ‘established business relationship’
for purposes of the TCPA by requesting to be placed on a ‘do not call’ list.”199
Moreover, this will not force consumers to terminate all aspects of the business
relationship. In Charvat’s case, according to the court’s decision, he will not have to
cancel his Sunday subscription, thus giving him both the protection of the TCPA

191

Jerry Markon, “Don’t Call” Laws Raise False Hope for Peace, Quiet, WALL S. J., Dec.
22, 2000, at B1 (quoting Linda Goldstein, a New York lawyer who represents telemarketers.).
192

Charvat, 769 N.E.2d 829.

193

Id. at 830.

194

Id.

195

Id.

196

Id.

197

Charvat, 769 N.E.2d at 830.

198
Id. But see In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act, 10 F.C.C.R. 12,391, n.32 (“We emphasize that a request not to be
called would also sever an established business relationship. Thus, such a request would
obligate a person or entity in an established business relationship with the resident to comply
with the rules on telephone solicitiation.” (citations omitted)).
199

Id. at syllabus.
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from telemarketing calls by the newspaper, as well as the benefits of his Sunday
subscription.200 In other words, the Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision gives
consumers the best of both worlds; they can continue to purchase a good or service
from a business entity, yet also be rid of telemarketing calls from that entity. As the
Charvat Court held, “[i]t is not consistent with the [TCPA] that a person who
subscribes to the daily newspaper in a one-newspaper town must be prisoner to
telephone pitches for a publisher’s panoply of products.”201
Situations like that presented in Charvat present a legitimate reason as to why the
“established business relationship” should be reevaluated and/or eliminated by the
FCC. For example, what if the soliciting entity is much larger than a newspaper?
Are subsidiaries or parent companies part of the “business” for purposes of
establishing a business relationship? The issue has yet to be litigated, but if the term
“business” is interpreted expansively, consumers’ do-not-call requests ought to be
treated the same way as in the Charvat decision. Situations like Charvat are the
precise reason why the loophole needs to be closed. A consumer should never be
“forced” to receive telephone solicitations as a mere consequence of him or her
buying goods and services, and the Charvat decision is definitely a step in the right
direction.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Telemarketing is a booming industry, and is likely to become even larger in the
future. However, the industry is unique in that it can come directly into the
consumer’s home in order to solicit goods, services, and donations. Moreover, the
ring of the telephone demands immediate attention, and cannot be ignored, thus
making the practice of telemarketing all the more invasive. Yet the public has made
it known that big business should never outweigh personal privacy. Consumers’
antipathy toward the telemarketing industry is evidenced in state and federal laws,
judicial opinions, articles, essays, and also in the popular culture and media.202 The
200
Id. at 834 (“The FCC does not require that the subscriber stop purchasing from a
company associated with the telemarketer. It requires only that the consumer seek to cease the
‘voluntary two-way communication’ that is the definitional heart of the ‘established business
relationship.’”).
201

Id.

202
Consider comedian Jerry Seinfeld’s view of telemarketing, as exhibited in an episode of
his NBC sitcom:

UNIDENTIFIED ACTRESS: Well, I…
(SEINFELD): I’m sorry. Excuse me one second.
(PHONE RINGING) Hello.
(TELEMARKETER): Hi, would you be interested in switching over to TMI long-distance
service?
SEINFELD: Oh, gee, I can’t talk right now. Why don’t you give me your home number
and I’ll call later?
(LAUGHTER)
(TELEMARKETER): Well, I’m sorry. We’re not allowed to do that.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol50/iss3/6

24

2002-03]

HOW CAN THEY KEEP CALLING ME?

511

public’s loathing of telemarketing is perhaps the most amplified on the Internet,
where the consumer’s collective voice is heard through consumer advocacy websites.
Congress took a big step in enacting the TCPA, which remains to be consumers’
most effective weapon in the fight against the telemarketing industry. However, the
federal law is replete with loopholes and exemptions, which has prompted many
states to draft tougher laws regulating telemarketing. However, doubt remains as to
the constitutional validity of the state statutes regarding federal preemption.
Moreover, many of the state statutes possess the same exemptions and loopholes as
the TCPA, making overall telemarketing regulation fairly ineffective.
In response to growing consumer complaints, the FTC proposed the creation of a
national do-not-call registry whereby telemarketing regulation would be uniform on
a national scale. Pursuant to the proposal, consumers would conceivably add their
own telephone numbers to the list, and the list would then be sold to telemarketers
across the nation. However, this proposal faces severe logistical and substantive
concerns. The implementation of a national registry would be costly, hard to
maintain, and raise serious consumer privacy issues.
In addition, because the FTC has limited jurisdiction, the national registry would
not apply to many of the entities that are the most fervent telemarketers, including
phone companies and charities, thereby rendering the national list modestly effective
at best. A national registry would be more effective if the FCC sponsored the
proposal, because the FCC has much broader jurisdiction than the FTC. However,
the FCC has not yet expressed any inclination of implementing such a list.
Therefore, it would be wise for telemarketing opponents to lobby the FCC for such a
proposal, because a “do-not-call” list program sponsored by the FCC would be much
more effective than the same proposal sponsored by the FTC.
Another possible solution is to reverse the rationale of the national do-not-call list
and make the list one that includes those rare consumers who want to be called. The
list could then be distributed to telemarketers, who would only call those consumers
who consented to being called. Such a proposal would make telemarketing more
efficient and telemarketers would know they were calling willing potential
customers. If such a list were proposed, perhaps the true status of telemarketing in
the minds of consumers would be indicated by how many people signed up to accept
telemarketing calls.
Currently, federal and state anti-telemarketing laws are relatively weak and need
to be strengthened by the reevaluation and/or elimination of exemptions for taxexempt nonprofit organizations, including charities. While there is strong public
policy in favor of an exemption for charities, an alarmingly vast amount of all money
donated will go straight into the hands of telemarketers, and not the charities.
Furthermore, the contingent-fee telemarketing on behalf of charities is exceedingly
susceptible to fraud. As an alternative, why not allow the consumers the choice of
not only to what charity they will donate but whether or not to donate at all? By
SEINFELD: I guess you don’t want people calling you at home.
(TELEMARKETER): No.
SEINFELD: Well now you know how I feel.
CNN Today: Several States Considering Legislation That Would Restrict Telemarketing
(CNN Television Broadcast, Jan. 12, 2001) (transcript available at LEXIS, News, Transcript #
01011211V13).
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nudging consumers to take a little initiative, money donated would go directly to the
charity of choice, and the telemarketers would be cut out of the loop completely.
As far as the “established business relationship” loophole is concerned, cases like
Charvat are a step in the right direction for the rights of consumers. If the Charvat
rationale becomes national policy, consumers will have the benefit of being able to
purchase goods and services from whomever they want without having to worry
about another telemarketer invading their homes. As the Charvat Court so prudently
noted, “[t]he purpose of the [TCPA] is to reduce the nuisance aspect of
telemarketing. Maintaining some commercial tie to a business should not leave
consumers at the mercy of unbridled telemarketing efforts.”203
A complete ban on telemarketing, although arguably constitutional, would likely
meet strong resistance. A $600 billion per year industry employing over 6 million
people is vital to a thriving economy and is likely to put up a substantial fight.
Moreover, a small minority of the population may actually enjoy telemarketing calls.
Nevertheless, the larger majority should have the benefit of more stringent
regulations on the telemarketing industry as a whole. Many consumers find
telemarketing of all types equally frustrating, and they are entitled to laws that
actually protect them. Federal and state laws that are replete with loopholes and
exemptions fix only part of the problem. Congress, along with the FCC and state
governments, must act to purge the anti-telemarketing laws of loopholes that make
the laws weak and ineffective. Once these exemptions are eliminated, the laws will
be more effective, efficient, and useful to the consumer.
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